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Highlights
• In the context of the current revamping of Regulation 994/2010 on the security of 
gas supply (herea er the “Gas SoS Regulation”), this short paper from the Florence 
School of Regulation investigates ways to strengthen the EU regulatory framework 
for long-term import contracts (herea er “LTCs”) with non-EU gas suppliers.  e 
focus is exclusively on commercial contracts. 
• While LTCs do not constitute an impediment to competition or security of supply 
“per se” – they may actually enrich the energy mix and source diversi cation of 
certain EU Member States, contributing to their stability and security - it is undeni-
able that in some cases the dominance of a foreign supplier strongly impacts market 
competition and limits a Member State’s economic and political choices.  e impact 
of LTCs on security of gas supply and competition is therefore markedly di erent 
in hub-based Western markets and isolated Eastern markets.  e issue raised by 
LTCs is both real and localised.  e problem-solving potential of an e ective imple-
mentation of the third energy and infrastructure packages cannot be emphasised 
enough, but transitory measures appear necessary.
• In essence, the existing EU regulatory framework on LTCs (mainly EU competi-
tion law, REMIT and Article 13(6)(b) of the Gas SoS Regulation) follows a ‘reac-
tive’ approach, as it principally aims to respond to a budding gas supply crisis or a 
market abuse that has already occurred. Both the EU competition law and REMIT 
work ex post.  ey are not underpinned by a security of supply rationale and are 
unable to address the concerns of the most vulnerable Member States as regards 
the security of their gas supply.  e Gas SoS transparency mechanism is a forward-
looking instrument, but it only reaches its full e ect in the so-called alert and emer-
gency stages. It is also fundamentally limited by severe design  aws and enforce-
ment issues.
• In this context, we advocate (i) an enhancement of the transparency framework 
anticipated by Art 13(6)(b) of the Gas SoS Regulation, both in its national and 
European dimensions; and (ii) the creation of a noti cation mechanism allowing 
for control by national regulators ex ante, i.e. before LTCs are signed.
•  e noti cation mechanism, conditioned by a market share threshold, should be 
as simple as possible to limit regulatory costs and red tape.  e assessment should 
be largely limited to (i) the most harmful infringements of competition law, which 
could be de ned within dedicated so  law guidelines; and (ii) potential breaches of 
the Gas SoS Regulation, so as to limit the likelihood of regulatory errors. To make 
sure that regional and EU interests are well accounted for, and potential national 
regulatory capture is o set, an obligation modelled on Art 36(8) and (9) of the Gas 
Directive to request a binding opinion from the Commission should be introduced. 
In the longer term, ACER should be given a more central role.
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1. Introduction
 e issue of long-term import contracts (henceforth “LTCs”) 
with non-EU gas suppliers has been at the forefront of the EU 
energy policy debate for a considerable period of time. Back in 
2003, the second liberalisation Directive had already acknowl-
edged their necessity to ensure security of gas supply in the EU, 
as long as they were compatible with the objectives of the Direc-
tive and with the rules of the Treaty. At that time, LTCs were 
largely perceived as a competition problem, even though the 
preparatory documents leading to the Directive already pro-
vided evidence that EU institutions were divided on the impact 
of these contracts on security of gas supply. In a series of cases 
against Gazprom and Sonatrach in the early 2000s, DG Comp 
only partly tackled the problem through EU competition law, by 
focusing on unlawful territorial restrictions and pro t sharing 
mechanisms. In 2007, the DG Comp sector inquiry empha-
sised the potential anticompetitive e ects of LTCs, particularly 
regarding access to upstream supply markets, market liquidity 
and customer foreclosure.  e ongoing competition probe 
against Gazprom for the alleged abuse of dominance on Central 
and Eastern European gas supply markets shows that competi-
tion issues remain a serious source of concern to this day.
 e successive Ukraine-Russia transit crises also provided con-
crete evidence that an unwarranted level of dependency on a 
single supplier may endanger security of gas supply in some of 
the most vulnerable EU Member States. Dependency, which is 
not problematic “per se”, might involve issues related to supply 
and transit. In this context, LTCs are always caught between 
law and politics. Externally, impinging on LTCs quickly 
heightens geopolitical tensions, in particular with Russia. 
Internally, Member States have always been reluctant to see the 
EU intervene in their external relations with non-EU gas sup-
pliers. Some progress has been made with the Council Decision 
of October 2012, which established an information exchange 
mechanism for intergovernmental agreements (henceforth 
“IGAs”) between Member States and third countries in the  eld 
of energy. However, a lot remains to be done in this area, as 
demonstrated by the public consultation launched by the Com-
mission in July 2015. 
 e issue of the suitability of the existing EU regulatory frame-
work for LTCs resurfaced recently in the Commission sta 
working document of 16 October 2014 (SWD(2014) 325  nal) 
on the implementation of the Regulation 994/2010 on secu-
rity of gas supply (herea er the “Gas SoS Regulation”). In this 
paper, the Commission argued that the lack of transparency of 
these contracts was a source of concern for vulnerable Member 
States without supply diversi cation and gas hubs, and called 
for a strengthened transparency framework.  e issue was 
raised again in the European Council conclusions of 19 and 20 
March 2015 .  e European Council recalled that both IGAs 
and commercial contracts should be plainly in line with EU 
law, in particular with the security of supply legislation, though 
safeguards for business con dentiality should be ensured.
In such context, this short analysis investigates the possible 
ways of strengthening the existing EU regulatory framework 
for LTCs with non-EU gas suppliers. We focus exclusively on 
commercial contracts, as opposed to IGAs. Undoubtedly, a 
well-functioning internal energy market, where transparency 
and well de ned rules are implemented, “would  nally enable 
a proper degree of cross-border coordination, which is required 
for a market response to a gas supply disruption”.4 Our proposals 
should in no way be seen as contradicting or replacing full 
implementation of the third energy (including network codes) 
and infrastructure packages.
2. LTCs and the Internal Market: 
Impact on SoS and Competition – 
Understanding the Issue
Despite the emergence of a competitive and integrated internal 
gas market in some parts of the EU, LTCs are far from becoming 
a residual instrument in the gas business. Indeed, “[…] new 
long-term contracts are still being signed, although their duration 
(typically around 10-15 years) is lower than the average duration 
of legacy contracts (20-25 years)”5. In addition, the trend towards 
shorter contracts only concerns the new contracts, whereas 
there are no signs of downward modi cations to the contract 
duration in the process of renegotiation a ecting existing LTCs. 
Save for a few cases, expired LTCs have all been renewed.6
LTCs are based on complex long-term arrangements negoti-
ated on a bilateral basis, sometimes at the inter-state level. 
Such contracts fall outside the scope of organised markets, and 
hence make it di  cult for regulators to draw a clear picture of 
the overall gas trade. Firstly, the general framework of a LTC 
regularly lacks information or displays it in a non-typical way: 
unsurprisingly, in the new REMIT Regulation, LTCs belong 
to the category of “non-standardised contracts”. Secondly, the 
underlying deal may envisage di erent prices for the di erent 
time periods of delivery within the overall delivery time-range, 
based on pre-agreed indices, the nature of which tends to be 
complex and highly contract-speci c.  erefore, it is o en not 
possible to identify precise quantities or prices at the time of 
execution/delivery.  irdly, the quantities to be delivered gen-
erally have a high degree of optionality: contrary to “standard 
contracts” where clear and precise rules tend to guarantee cer-
tainty of delivery, the amount of gas eventually delivered may 
4. CEER Concept Paper on Security of Gas Supply, July 2015.
5. “Long-term Gas Contracts in Europe”, CIEP 2014.
6. See  ndings of the Commission in its sta  working document of 16 Oc-
tober 2014, (SWD(2014) 325  nal, 18-19.
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be uncertain and subject to the discretion of one of the two 
contracting parties.
In order to have a complete and accurate overview of the Euro-
pean gas market, one cannot disregard the impact of LTCs on 
cross-border  ows and the availability of capacity at the dif-
ferent points of delivery.  is is true not only for monitoring 
security of supply, but also for e  cient competition and for the 
e ective identi cation of potential market abuses7. As ACER 
rightly pointed out; “Reporting of records of transactions in non-
standardised contracts is crucial to have a complete picture of the 
trading activities of market participants. Market abuse practices 
like ramping or cross-market manipulation could not or only 
hardly be detected without information on non-standardised 
contracts”. For instance, a market participant being a seller in a 
long-term contract with price components depending on develop-
ments of spot market prices could in uence the spot market prices 
by buying at arti cial high prices to bene t from these higher 
prices as a seller in the long-term contract(s). If no information 
were available on the long-term contracts, the activity on the spot 
markets alone would not necessarily be su  cient to identify sus-
picious instances. Only with the knowledge about the long-term 
contracts the picture is complete.8”
On the competition side, the impact of LTCs mainly depends 
on the development of spot and forward markets as well as 
horizontal and vertical market concentration. Pricing schemes 
which create excessive pricing or price discrimination and con-
tract clauses such as duration, exclusivity, termination rights, 
rebates, destination and use restrictions (creating market 
partitioning) must be looked at carefully. Of course, LTCs 
help to hedge price and quantity risks, mitigate counterparty 
credibility risks and facilitate bank  nancing (and thus invest-
ment). However, if they do not allow for e  cient renegotia-
tion/adaptation, LTCs may yield e  ciency losses for individual 
contracting parties. In di erent ways, LTCs may have nega-
tive e ects on market opening. Customer foreclosure is cre-
ated, in particular, by the exclusivity, tacit renewal and penalty 
clauses, and by rebate mechanisms.  e resulting illiquidity of 
spot markets does not create transparency on the evolution of 
supply and demand, and on the costs of incumbents, which 
may hinder entry. LTCs might also result in stabilising market 
shares, thereby creating tacit collusion.  e impact on competi-
tion is therefore very di erent in hub-based Western markets 
with a diversi ed portfolio of suppliers and liquid markets as 
well as su  cient infrastructure, and in certain Eastern Member 
7. Additionally, the availability of certain gas capacities linked to LTCs, at 
present, could only be detected through a speci c legal instrument.  is 
is the case, for example of the so-called “hanging capacities” which were 
originally linked to LTCs and terminated at a second stage.
8. ACER Recommendations on REMIT Records of Transactions, 23 Octo-
ber 2012.
States without supply diversi cation and gas hubs, where the 
national gas market is not yet “mature” or fully developed.
On the security of supply side, the potential problem comes 
from the lack of diversi cation. As there is an option to resell 
contracted gas on the European market and the portfolio of 
gas suppliers is changing, with a lesser share of LTCs, it is 
increasingly di  cult to assess the impact of LTCs on security 
of supply in many parts of the Western hub-based gas mar-
kets. However, in several vulnerable Member States, long-term 
contracts remain an important element for security of supply. 
At the wholesale level, gas imports in these Member states are 
typically subject to long-term contracts between the national 
incumbent and a single external supplier. While the long term 
character of a contract per se does not necessarily raise con-
cerns – and/or can even be supportive in terms of security of 
supply – diversi cation is a source of concern.  e situation 
is even more problematic in countries where the energy mix 
does not include su  cient generation from renewable sources, 
or the existing infrastructure does not allow for reverse  ows 
or other alternatives to the traditional East-West routes of gas 
pipelines. In some of these countries, the reliability and sta-
bility of gas  ows is mostly guaranteed by long-term contracts 
with the external supplier.
In a nutshell, the impact of LTCs on security of gas supply and 
competition is markedly di erent in hub-based Western mar-
kets and isolated Eastern markets once these LTCs are signed.
3.  e Shortcomings of the Existing EU 
Regulatory Framework: the Limits of a 
‘Reactive’ Approach
 e existing EU regulatory framework for LTCs with non-EU 
gas suppliers pursues two objectives: responding to an emer-
gency supply crisis and tackling market abuse. It operates 
through three complementary but partly overlapping instru-
ments: an ex ante transparency mechanism structured by the 
Gas SoS Regulation, an ex post EU competition enforcement 
by the Commission and a sort of hybrid ex post mechanism 
combining transparency and enforcement by national regula-
tors through REMIT.9 
3.1  e limits of the Gas SoS Regulation transparency 
mechanism
Under Art 13(6)(b) of the Gas SoS Regulation, gas companies 
must notify the ‘competent authority’ (hence not necessarily 
the national regulator) of those contracts with suppliers from 
third countries, which have a duration of more than one year. 
9.  e ex ante / ex post dichotomy refers here to the period either before, or 
a er, a particular contract is signed or a particular trade takes place.
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However, the contracts themselves do not have to be reported. 
 e transparency requirements only concern certain charac-
teristics: contract duration, forecast of total annual volume and 
average volume per month, delivery points and forecasted daily 
maximum volume in case of alert or emergency.10 
 e national emergency plans covered by Art (10)(1)(k) of 
the Gas SoS Regulation must detail the reporting obligations 
imposed on natural gas undertakings at alert and emergency 
levels. National emergency plans also establish a list of prede-
 ned actions to make gas available in the event of an emergency, 
including commercial agreements between the parties involved 
in such actions and the compensation mechanisms for natural 
gas undertakings where appropriate, taking due account of the 
con dentiality of sensitive data. Such actions may involve cross-
border agreements between Member States and/or natural gas 
companies, under Art (10)(1)(i) of the Regulation.
 e Commission has dra ed a template that the competent 
authorities must complete.  e competent authorities must 
then notify the Commission of these data under an aggregate 
form. On a regular basis, information must be updated. Of 
course, the Commission and the competent authority have a 
duty to ensure con dentiality. According to the Commission’s 
sta  working document of 16 October 2014, only 10 Member 
States had provided information using the template and  ve 
(mostly Eastern and Baltic) Member States provided non-
aggregated data. 
It follows from the above that the Gas SoS Regulation transpar-
ency mechanism su ers from severe shortcomings and imple-
mentation  ows:
1. “in case of alert or emergency only”: some key infor-
mation is either not communicated to the competent 
authority or is communicated at a very late stage (expected 
daily max. volumes). 
2. the ‘competent authority’ problem: the competent 
authority (e.g., a ministry) does not necessarily have the 
10. Art 10(3) of the Gas SoS Regulation foresees 3 steps:
“(a) early warning level (early warning): when there is concrete, serious and 
reliable information that an event may occur which is likely to result in 
the signi cant deterioration of the supply situation and is likely to lead 
to the alert or the emergency level being triggered; the early warning 
level may be activated by an early warning mechanism;
(b) alert level (alert): when a supply disruption or exceptionally high gas de-
mand occurs which results in the signi cant deterioration of the supply 
situation, but the market is still able to manage that disruption or de-
mand without the need to resort to non-market measures;
(c) emergency level (emergency): in the event of exceptionally high gas de-
mand, a signi cant supply disruption or other signi cant deterioration 
of the supply situation, and in the event that all relevant market meas-
ures have been implemented, but the supply of gas is insu  cient to meet 
the remaining gas demand, so that non-market measures have to be ad-
ditionally introduced with a view, in particular, to safeguarding the sup-
plies of gas to protected customers according to Article 8.”
same sanction powers as those ensured by the third lib-
eralisation package for regulators.  ey might not have 
either the same level of understanding or even information 
on market functioning. 
3. the ‘data aggregation’ problem: the Commission is largely 
kept in the dark due to data aggregation.  is might have 
an impact on the Commission’s assessment of national 
preventive and emergency plans and its ability to declare 
emergency situations at the EU and regional levels, even 
though the Commission can declare the existence of such 
a situation only when two competent authorities have 
requested it. In addition, the Regulation does not specify a 
timeframe for information updates.
4. the ‘lack of teeth’ problem: the mechanism does not 
specify clear sanction powers or to which entity such 
powers should be allocated when relevant data is not pro-
vided by gas companies.
5. the ‘one size  ts all’ problem: the mechanism does not 
introduce di erentiation in terms of transparency require-
ments according to the market situation (e.g. hub-based 
Western markets and isolated Eastern markets), creating 
both unnecessary regulatory costs and red tape.
6. the ‘Europeanisation’ problem: the mechanism does 
not allow for an information exchange mechanism across 
neighbouring Member States, whereas, as per Art 9 of the 
Gas SoS Regulation, competent authorities should do their 
national risk assessment with regards to real (projected) 
 ows, including cross-border  ows.  e same problem 
occurs when competent authorities decide to build 
regional preventive plans (Art 4(3)).
3.2  e limits of EU competition enforcement
Up until now, EU competition law has been the main regula-
tory device used to address the negative e ects of LTCs with 
non-EU gas suppliers.  e ongoing battle between the Com-
mission and Gazprom shows that this instrument can be used, 
even in a highly politicised context. It nonetheless su ers from 
serious shortcomings.
First, it is yet to be proven that competition enforcers can suit-
ably integrate into the analysis all of the foreseeable issues per-
tinent to security of gas supply. Indeed, the concept of abuse 
under Art 102 TFEU might not cover, for instance, breaches 
of relevant provisions of the Gas SoS Regulation or the third 
energy package. In addition, the enforcement of EU compe-
tition law might not coincide with individual preferences of 
Member States as regards their security of gas supply. 
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Second, competition enforcement tends to be slow. It can take 
years to reach a decision and possibly a court judgment. In 
addition, compliance with decisions and judgments cannot be 
taken for granted in this context. 
 ird, damages cannot always be quanti ed with accuracy, or at 
all, in the context of subsequent damage suits. Redress and com-
pensation through the private enforcement of competition law 
is therefore not reliable, in particular for household customers. 
3.3  e limits of the REMIT mechanism
According to Art 7(1) of REMIT, ACER shall collect the data 
for assessing and monitoring wholesale energy markets as pro-
vided for in Art 8 of REMIT.
 e Commission’s implementing acts set the deadline for 
eligible market participants to start reporting on wholesale 
energy contracts (over-the-counter standard and non-standard 
supply contracts, transportation contracts) and on the report-
able fundamental data from Transmission, LNG and Storage 
System Operators. Non-OMP contracts, i.e. contracts that 
are not traded via brokers or through exchange platforms, 
must therefore be reported only as of 7 April 2016. LTCs with 
non-EU gas suppliers fall into this category. Reporting takes 
place in case of execution, modi cation or the early termina-
tion of a transaction.11
O en, LTCs (with optionality) have daily executions: this 
means that the commodity purchased under a LTC is delivered 
daily at an entry point and then re-traded (either bilaterally or 
via exchange).  e long-term (framework) contract will then 
be reported as a non-standard contract (describing optionality 
and complex pricing formulas). Individual daily executions 
will also be reported, but as standard contracts because they 
will have an outright price and volume.
 e limits of this way of reporting ex post are obvious: while 
LTCs (framework) are reported in general terms and as non-
standard contracts, the information (volumes, prices, etc.) on 
the daily deliveries or deals which are subsequent to the same 
framework contract are reported as standard contracts.  is 
means that the two categories of data cannot be matched, or 
considered as belonging to the same agreement. As such, infor-
mation collected under REMIT only provides a partial over-
view of the underlying agreement of a transaction.
Additionally, information collected under REMIT is only vis-
ible by ACER: market parties communicate the data of their 
wholesale transactions through a so-called RRM (Registered 
11. According to the ACER Manual of Procedures on transaction and fun-
damental data reporting of 18 June 2015, non-standard supply contracts 
need to be reported following the requirements of Table 2 of the Annex 
of the implementing acts: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:JOL_2014_363_R_0009&from=EN
Reporting Mechanism) which interfaces with ACER directly. 
 is implies that at no stage are national regulators or the EU 
Commission involved in this process. 
3.4 From a Reactive to a Proactive Approach
In essence, the EU regulatory framework for LTCs with 
non-EU gas suppliers follows a ‘reactive’ approach, in the sense 
that it is not pre-emptive, but principally aims to respond once 
a gas supply crisis or a market abuse has already occurred or is 
in the making. We can see that regulatory powers concerning 
security of supply are still (unsurprisingly) largely in the hands 
of national governments. In some countries, this re ects the 
national division of constitutional responsibilities on security 
of supply.
EU competition law and REMIT work ex post and mainly, in 
the end, on hoped-for deterrence e ects.  ey are not under-
pinned by a security of supply rationale and are thus unable 
to address the concerns of the most vulnerable Member States 
on this matter. It would be accurate to say that the Gas SoS 
transparency mechanism is a forward-looking instrument. 
However, it only reaches its real e ect in the so-called alert 
and emergency stages. Furthermore, it is fundamentally lim-
ited by severe design and enforcement  aws.12  is necessitates 
turning to a more ‘proactive’ approach.
In our view, a more proactive EU regulatory framework for 
LTCs with non-EU gas suppliers should:
• ensure e ective transparency, i.e. that information on gas 
 ows and available capacity at the various entry/exit points 
of the network is available in order to allow for the most 
accurate picture of all relevant gas  ows.13 
• make sure that both the security of supply and competition 
concerns are taken into account concurrently;
•  ne-tune the role of the di erent players (national regula-
tors, competent authorities, the Commission, ACER);
• re ne the interaction of the available regulatory instruments;
• ensure that the EU and regional interests are well accounted 
for;
• guarantee proportionality: regulatory costs and red tape 
should be kept to a minimum to account for the fact that 
hub-based Western markets and isolated Eastern markets 
are in di erent situations.
12. It must be mentioned that other mechanisms such as the early warning 
mechanism with Russia or information sharing within the Energy Com-
munity must also be taken into account.
13.  is shall include measures urging TSOs and SSOs to implement the 
relevant  ird Package provisions concerning information transpar-
ency and to make related data available on the ENTSO-G transparency 
platform. 
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In this context, we advocate:
a) an enhancement of the transparency framework and
b) the introduction of a noti cation mechanism allowing for 
the control of LTCs ex ante, i.e. before they are signed.
Ex ante control mechanisms are o en characterised by worry-
ingly high regulatory costs and red tape. As a result, the noti -
cation mechanism should be as simple as possible14.
4. Towards a Strengthened Transparency 
Framework:  e Low Cost – High 
Reward Route
A strengthened transparency framework is all the more impor-
tant if an ex ante control mechanism does not exist. Both solu-
tions should not be seen as substitutes but as complementary 
actions. Indeed, once LTCs are signed, supply crises and market 
abuses can always occur.
Amending the REMIT reporting regime is not the right course 
of action in this context, even if it provides useful (repeat) infor-
mation on the market conditions (in particular, standard for-
ward contracts) in a speci c trading zone.  e reasons for this 
statement lie both in the qualitative and quantitative nature of 
reporting under REMIT. First of all, REMIT provisions impose 
reporting of all wholesale transactions’ data of a certain com-
pany on a daily basis, while the type of information we would 
like to obtain is very speci c and relates to data which might be 
useful in case of supply disruptions. Also, the massive amount 
of data reported under the current regulation provides such an 
exhaustive and complete set of information, which becomes 
di  cult to  lter in light of a certain purpose.  
We think that the Gas SoS Regulation transparency mechanism 
is thus the best candidate for improvement.
We propose to proceed according to the following guiding 
principles:
• Data reporting to the Commission should be improved, in 
particular through data disaggregation, even though it can 
be presumed that vulnerable Member States might be more 
likely to voluntarily provide data in such a format. A binding 
reporting to the Commission on the daily maximum vol-
umes at each delivery point, at least as soon as we enter the 
emergency stages, is important.
•  e EU Commission should be able to jointly analyse REMIT 
data and data reported under the Gas SoS Regulation trans-
14. For instance, the noti cation mechanism could be transitory, as long as 
an e ective implementation of the third energy and infrastructure pack-
ages has not taken place. A review clause, for instance a er 5 years, could 
be introduced. 
parency mechanism. Provisions concerning (binding) coop-
eration between the national regulator and the competent 
authority should be introduced.
• A binding timeframe for reporting by gas companies to the 
competent authority should be de ned.
• EU legislation should require Member States to make sure 
that appropriate sanction measures are put in place (and 
thus powers suitably allocated) when relevant data is not 
provided. 
•  e one-year period should not be amended. Contracts 
shorter than one-year cover a fairly marginal part of demand 
in Eastern markets, and Western markets are liquid enough 
so that such contracts are not crucial.
• Respecting business secrets and con dentiality issues is 
paramount. In this context, publishing even aggregated con-
tract data gathered through the di erent reporting mecha-
nisms is not a priority, even though it can provide a useful 
benchmark for the ongoing contract negotiations. 
5. Ex Ante Control Mechanism: Do Not 
Use a Hatchet to Remove a Fly
We envisaged three possible routes for the implementation of 
an ex ante mechanism:
5.1  e Competition Law Route
A  rst solution (the competition law route) would consist of 
strengthening the EU competition enforcement framework by 
introducing an ex ante element in terms of assessment. Fol-
lowing the rationale of the former Regulation 17, pre-noti ca-
tion of LTCs to the Commission for an ex ante compliance check 
with EU competition rules could be introduced. However, such 
a mechanism would not address most concerns depicted in 
section 3.2 and the pre-noti cation may impose too high of an 
administrative burden on the Commission (DG Comp).  ese 
problems could partially be alleviated through strengthened 
internal cooperation between DG Comp and DG Energy. 
 e Commission could also enact so  law guidelines on accept-
able contract forms in order to provide guidance to operators. 
However, the non-binding character of such guidelines would 
largely undermine their concrete outcomes. In addition, guide-
lines on the application of Article 101(3) TFEU already exist. 
An alternative option could consist of introducing a safe har-
bour in the context of a block exemption regulation, i.e. to de ne 
criteria ex ante in a part of the EU legislation, the ful lment of 
which would result in automatic compliance with the competi-
tion rules without the need for companies to notify contracts 
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beforehand.  is approach would have merit, as it would pro-
vide legal certainty to operators and limit the administrative 
burden on the Commission. It would, however, lack  exibility 
as no assessment of concrete situations would be carried out, as 
in the case of so  law guidelines. In addition, it remains di  cult 
(but certainly not impossible) to de ne criteria that would be 
relevant for the whole Union due to the diversity of real-world 
EU gas market settings. 
5.2  e National Regulators Route
A second and more promising solution (the national regu-
lators route) would be to introduce, at the national level, a 
simple noti cation mechanism of the LTCs themselves, such 
as the one foreseen for merchant transmission investments.15 
 anks to their continuous interaction with market partici-
pants, national regulators have a unique understanding of their 
national gas market and of its equilibrium. A good advan-
tage of the “national regulators route” would indeed be to 
place national regulators at the centre of the game. It is worth 
recalling that in its  rst reading of the second gas Directive, the 
European Parliament had already recommended that regula-
tory authorities be entrusted with the ability to call LTCs into 
question. Member States could provide that their regulatory 
authority would submit its opinion on the noti cation to the 
competent authority, for the purposes of the formal decision. 
Informal discussions between the national regulator and gas 
companies in the contract negotiation phase could take place 
if di  culties are anticipated. As national regulators would only 
be responsible for their own markets, regulatory costs would 
be manageable. In addition, a provision stating that, without a 
formal decision by the national regulator a er a certain period 
of time (e.g. 1 month), a positive decision would be deemed 
to be adopted, could be introduced.  is would allow national 
regulators to focus administrative resources on the potentially 
most harmful LTCs.  e national regulator could be given the 
option to extend the assessment period up to e.g. 3 months.
 e two main challenges with the national regulators route are 
(i) to avoid an unnecessary burden on  rms and (ii) make sure 
that regional and EU interests are taken into account.
(i) Given the di erences between hub-based Western mar-
kets and isolated Eastern markets, the problem of red tape 
should be taken seriously. A way to solve the issue would 
be to de ne ex ante contracts, which have to be noti ed. It 
should be done at EU level. A simple criterion, which would 
15. Art 36 of the third gas Directive organises a mechanism where national 
regulators can grant derogations from certain provisions of the Direc-
tive, in particular third-party access, to private investors in gas infra-
structure, provided that certain criteria are met. In particular, such 
pro t-motivated investment should strengthen both competition and 
the security of gas supply.
encompass both the security of supply and competition 
issues, would be to de ne a market share threshold. Indeed, 
security of supply and most competition issues emerge when 
too high a part of the demand is serviced by a single contract 
or supplier.  is criterion has the advantage of being easy to 
administer.   
(ii) In order to make sure that both regional/EU interests 
are well accounted for and potential regulatory capture at 
national level is mitigated, an obligation modelled on Art 
36(8) and (9) of the Gas Directive to request a binding 
opinion from ACER or the Commission should be intro-
duced. ACER or the Commission could then require the 
national regulator to amend or withdraw its decision. To 
accelerate the procedure, LTCs received by national regu-
lators could be sent immediately to ACER and the Com-
mission. ACER or the Commission would have 1 month to 
adopt a binding opinion, with the possibility for extension, 
a er the national regulator has adopted its preliminary deci-
sion. If the Commission is vested with that role, cooperation 
between DG Comp and DG Energy should be ensured.
5.3  e Euratom route
A third solution (the Euratom route) is to give a more central 
role to the Commission or ACER. 
 e  rst option along this line of thought would consider the 
introduction of a common purchasing mechanism (CPM) 
where ACER or the Commission would have an exclusive right 
to negotiate or conclude supply contracts.16 Lighter and vol-
untary versions of such mechanisms are currently being dis-
cussed for emergency situations, following the usual ‘reactive’ 
approach described above.  e idea of structuring a common 
purchasing scheme (aimed at regaining leverage on foreign 
gas suppliers) has been discussed for a long time but has lost 
momentum recently with the development of more competi-
tive and integrated markets in Western Europe.  is trend is 
clear from the recent communication of the Commission on 
the Energy Union. 
On the positive side, wider EU/regional interests would be 
better taken into account and issues concerning both security 
of supply and competition could be tackled together. On the 
negative side, it would create worryingly high regulatory costs 
as well as a host of fairly complicated EU and WTO law issues. 
Even more problematic, it would dramatically increase red tape 
for gas companies. Downstream competition would still need 
to be organised, probably through auctions. Overall, this  rst 
16. To introduce  exibility, the Gas SoS Regulation could include an opt-in 
mechanism in this regard where only willing Member States would par-
ticipate in the scheme.
8 ■  FSR - Policy Brief ■ Issue 2015/03 ■ November 2015
option, though interesting in theory, appears to overkill the 
problem at hand. 
A second option would be to implement a noti cation scheme 
inspired by the revision in 1960 and 1975 of the Regulation on 
the Euratom Supply Agency (ESA), where ESA is not involved 
in commercial negotiations, but still assess contracts, a er 
noti cation and within 10 days, against the principles of the 
common supply policy.17 In essence, this second option is sim-
ilar to the national regulator route discussed above, except for 
the fact that the national step is no longer included. 
5.4 Conclusions
A qualitative assessment of the di erent routes is provided in 
the table above.
 e competition law route is not able to solve the problem on its 
own. However, enactment of so  law guidelines could be used 
to complement a noti cation mechanism. Indeed, the di erent 
routes can be seen as complementary rather than as substitutes. 
 e Euratom (option 1 – CPM) route should not be introduced 
in view of the costs incurred. Contrary to this, a simple noti-
 cation mechanism should be introduced if it is well devised. 
We favour the national regulators route over the Euratom 
(option 2) route, at least in the short to medium term. Indeed, 
national regulators are best placed to simultaneously assess 
both security of gas supply and competition18 issues in their 
17. ESA is also party to the contract. We note that Euratom has an exclusive 
competence as regards EU supply policy in this  eld.
18. It is worth mentioning that they have o en been involved in competition 
proceedings.
own markets, as it is something they are accustomed to, and 
not just when they assess noti cation of merchant infrastruc-
ture projects.
Regulators are also used to cooperating with each other in dif-
ferent fora. Having a binding opinion from an EU body would 
allow for regional and European interests to be su  ciently 
taken into account, as well as addressing risks of national regu-
latory capture. We also believe that it would be more feasible 
from a political point of view. As long as the Commission is at 
the centre of the EU architecture on gas security of supply and 
ACER is short on internal resources, the EU opinion should 
be a competence of the Commission. In the longer term, we 
believe that ACER, being the recipient of REMIT data, should 
be given a more central role.
Last but not least, we think that the assessment conducted by the 
national regulators and the Commission should be structured 
in such a way as to limit the likelihood of regulatory errors. 
As we have seen in section 2 above, LTCs have ambiguous 
e ects on competition and security of supply, making it all the 
more di  cult to assess their potential e ects. We believe that 
the competition assessment should follow dedicated so  law 
guidelines enacted in this regard by the Commission and focus 
on the potentially most harmful infringements, such as territo-
rial restrictions.  e security of supply assessment should be 
limited to potential  breaches or impediments to the e ective 
implementation of the revised Gas SoS Regulation.  e latter 
could therefore be amended with such assessment in mind.
Options
Costs Bene ts
Regulatory Red tape
Ability to tackle 
both SoS and 
competition issues
EU/Regional 
interests Tailor decisions
 e competition 
law route
Ex ante 
noti cation
-- - - ++ ++
So  law guidelines +++ ++ -- - ---
Block exemption 
regulation
+++ ++ -- - ---
 e Euratom route
‘CPM’ ----- ---- ++ +++ ++
Ex ante 
Noti cation
-- - ++ +++ ++
 e national 
regulators route
Ex ante 
Noti cation + EU 
binding opinion
--- - ++ +++ +++
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